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Precautionary Savings Motives and Tax
Efﬁciency of Household Portfolios:
An Empirical Analysis
Gene Amromin, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Executive Summary
Theoretical portfolio models with taxable and tax-deferred savings re-
quire savers to locate higher-tax assets such as bonds in their tax-
deferred retirement accounts (TDAs) while keeping low-tax assets (eq-
uities) in taxable accounts. Yet, observed portfolio allocations are often
not tax efﬁcient. This paper empirically evaluates one of the explana-
tions for this puzzle that rests on the simultaneous presence of uninsur-
able labor income risk and limited accessibility of TDAassets. Together,
these elements lead some borrowing-constrained households to forgo
tax efﬁciency in favor of allocations that provide more liquidity in bad
income states—an outcome labeled as precautionary portfolio choice. The
analysis of household-level portfolio data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances suggests that both the choice of whether to hold a tax-efﬁcient
portfolio and the degree of portfolio tax inefﬁciency are related to the
presence and severity of precautionary motives.
1.1 Introduction
Portfolio choices of individual investors often appear puzzling to econ-
omists. This chapter focuses on one of the puzzles: the widespread tax
inefﬁciency of asset allocations of households investing in taxable and
tax-deferred accounts (TDAs). Although theoretical portfolio models re-
quire locating higher-tax assets such as bonds in tax-preferred accounts,
households routinely violate this rule in practice. Understanding this
choice is particularly important in light of the active political debate
over privatization of public pension schemes, which would shift the re-
sponsibility for making retirement portfolio choices to households.
Some studies estimate that tax-inefﬁcient allocations result in sizablewelfare losses.1 This chapter offers a somewhat different perspective by
focusing on the empirical investigation of the underlying reasons for
such irrational behavior. This chapter also provides evidence that losses
from tax inefﬁciency can be, at least partially, regarded as costs borne by
liquidity-constrained households to protect themselves against expo-
sure to uninsurable labor income risk.
Self-directed retirement accounts have become one of the main av-
enues for household savings in the United States, totaling about 7.5 tril-
lion dollars at the end of 2006.2 Such accounts are granted favorable tax
treatment and typically allow accumulation of retirement assets at pre-
tax rates of return. To ensure that TDA savings are used for their in-
tended purpose, this powerful tax incentive is counterbalanced by a
variety of restrictions on accessibility of TDA assets. With TDAs house-
holds must choose not only the appropriate mix of stocks and bonds that
differ in their tax treatment and risk-return characteristics, but also de-
cide on how much of each asset to locate in each of the two account types
that offer varying degrees of liquidity and tax preference. This joint
portfolio decision became known as the asset location and allocation
problem (Shoven 1999).
This problem has a clear-cut and intuitive solution, whose origins
date back to the pioneering work of Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) on
optimal portfolio choices of corporations interested in funding their
deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans. The solution is based on exploiting arbi-
trage opportunities that arise from being able to shelter high-tax assets
inside tax-favored retirement accounts. In particular, households are
advised to hold all higher-tax-burden assets inside TDAs. Only in cases
when desired holdings of high-tax assets exceed TDAcapacity can some
of them spill over into taxable accounts. These strictly specialized asset
location choices have acquired the label of tax efﬁcient.3 Tax-efﬁcient
portfolios appear to be optimal even in complex environments of recent
theoretical models that accommodate optimal timing of capital gains
realizations and stochastic tax rates (Huang 2006), availability of tax-
exempt bonds (Shoven and Sialm 2004), step-up of tax basis at death,
and stochastic labor income (Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang 2004).
The robustness of these results presents an empirical challenge be-
cause observed portfolios are often not tax efﬁcient. Survey data com-
monly show that the majority of U.S. households simultaneously hold
high-tax-burden bonds in their taxable accounts and low-tax-burden
assets (e.g., equities) in their TDAs (Poterba and Samwick 2001; Berg-
6 Amrominstresser and Poterba 2004). These households could improve their after-
tax returns by simply rearranging the location of their assets.
The goal of this chapter is to provide an empirical evaluation of the ob-
served portfolio choices in the context of models that emphasize the im-
portance of limited TDAaccessibility for households facing income or con-
sumption shocks. One such model is by Amromin (2003), in which
households are exposed to uninsurable labor income risk, manifested
through catastrophic and very infrequent unemployment spells.4 These
shocks create precautionary savings motives for borrowing-constrained
households. When such households are subject to TDA liquidity restric-
tions, the precautionary motives induce a tradeoff between their desire to
maintain tax-efﬁcient allocations and concern over the need to make costly
withdrawals from retirement accounts in the event of bad income draws.
As a result, a model with both labor income risk and accessibility restric-
tions can generate optimal portfolio allocations that are not tax efﬁcient.5
Of most interest, however, are the model’s predictions about the
cross-sectional distribution of household portfolio choices. The ﬁrst
testable prediction of the model is that households with weak precau-
tionary savings motives (due to a high level of accumulated assets or
low labor income risk) or those not subject to TDA liquidity restrictions
(over the age of 60) should have tax-efﬁcient portfolios. The rest of the
households, in contrast, are predicted to have mixed—precautionary—
asset allocations.
The other key message of the model is that the degree of tax efﬁ-
ciency—how close a given portfolio is to the “bonds in TDA, equities in
taxable accounts” dictum—is inversely related to the intensity of pre-
cautionary motives. In other words, households with stronger precau-
tionary motives are expected to have higher equity shares in TDAs and
lower equity shares in taxable accounts. The prediction itself is quite
intuitive. When access to TDA assets is very costly, TDAs are used pri-
marily to accumulate retirement wealth. In contrast, liquid taxable ac-
counts are much better suited for smoothing potential income shocks.
Thus, households that face high labor income risk and have limited liq-
uid ﬁnancial resources satisfy their strong precautionary motives by
choosing a safer portfolio mix in the taxable investment account and by
decreasing their TDAcontributions. To address their retirement savings
concerns, they increase the share of equities in their tax-deferred ac-
counts. Tax efﬁciency gets trumped both by precautionary motives in
taxable accounts and by retirement savings motives in TDAs.6
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ary motives on portfolio choice (Kimball 1993; Bertaut and Haliassos
1995, 1997) considered a single investment habitat. They found that the
presence of precautionary motives leads to lower portfolio equity
shares. Empirical support for this hypothesis has been mixed.7 How-
ever, as argued above, precautionary motives are likely to have oppos-
ing effects on equity holdings in taxable and tax-deferred accounts.
Hence, differentiating between account habitats in empirical tests pro-
vides a novel way to identify precautionary effects in portfolio compo-
sition.
Household-level data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is
used here to test both predictions: who holds tax-efﬁcient portfolios and
whose portfolios are more tax efﬁcient.8 Empirical results lend support
for the key insights of the model. In particular, households with more
volatile labor income and those subject to early withdrawal penalties on
TDA assets are less likely to choose tax-efﬁcient portfolios. In addition,
factors associated with stronger precautionary savings motives—such
as having a higher fraction of one’s wealth in a tax-deferred account or
a riskier labor income process—indicate stronger precautionary portfo-
lio choices, consisting of a safer taxable account allocation and a riskier
TDA mix.
These ﬁndings bear on several policy questions pertaining to the rules
for tax-deferred savings plans and the revenue costs projections for such
plans. Various budget-forecasting models are affected by assumptions
of what assets are held in retirement accounts—since portfolio compo-
sition of TDAs directly inﬂuences their tax cost estimates (e.g., Burnham
2004). Since this chapter explicitly focuses on how these portfolio
choices vary with household characteristics and institutional TDA fea-
tures faced by speciﬁc households, it can potentially enrich the existing
tax policy analysis. Suppose, for instance, that TDA assets were ex-
empted from early withdrawal penalties in cases of job loss. The results
of this chapter suggest that in this new setting, households may rebal-
ance their taxable and tax-deferred portfolios, as they would be able to
satisfy their precautionary motives that derive from labor risk consider-
ations by holding high-tax-burden bonds in TDAs. This would improve
household welfare but result in lower overall tax revenues—both from
capital income and withdrawal fees. Moreover, assets held in more liq-
uid TDAs would have higher equivalent taxable wealth values (Poterba
2004), which may encourage households to increase their contributions
to such accounts. Thus, rule modiﬁcations aimed at lowering the insur-
8 Amrominance cost for precautionary households are likely to affect revenue cost
estimates of tax-deferred savings—by both inﬂuencing TDA ﬂows and
the overall portfolio composition.
Several recent empirical studies provided systematic analyses of
household portfolio allocations between and within taxable and tax-
deferred accounts. Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) present extensive ev-
idence of heterogeneity in habitat-speciﬁc portfolio location and alloca-
tion choices in the SCF and evaluate the extent to which household
portfolios deviate from tax-efﬁciency. Although the authors discuss the
effects that age, wealth, income, and marginal tax rates have on these
choices, their study does not explicitly consider the effects of labor in-
come risk or liquidity constraints. Barber and Odean (2004) estimate rel-
ative preferences for holding various assets (e.g., munis, stocks, mutual
funds) in taxable or tax-deferred brokerage accounts. While these data
are sufﬁcient to analyze whether households are tax-efﬁcient, they can-
not be used to address the extent of tax inefﬁciency. In contrast, the em-
pirical investigation in the present chapter considers the entire portfolio
of household ﬁnancial assets and evaluates it in the context of a speciﬁc
dual-habitat portfolio model with precautionary savings motives.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy re-
views the existing literature and contrasts its theoretical predictions
with observed household portfolios, while imputing the cost of the dis-
crepancy. Section 3 outlines the properties of portfolio allocations in a
dual-habitat precautionary model, while section 4 describes the data
and sets up the empirical tests. Section 5 presents econometric analysis,
and section 6 summarizes the results and offers directions for future re-
search.
1.2 How Common and How Costly are Tax-Inefﬁcient Portfolios?
There exists a recent body of theoretical literature on portfolio decisions
of investors with both taxable and tax-deferred savings options. The
dual-habitat portfolio problem is solved numerically (Shoven and Sialm
2004), analytically (Huang 2006), or through a combination of analytical
arguments and numerical methods (Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang 2004).
As stated earlier, the general message that emerges from solutions to
these models is that the primary goal of the asset location decision is to
achieve Tepper-Black tax efﬁciency. In the United States, equities are tax-
favored in several respects. They are taxed at lower rates than interest-
paying assets, are subject to tax breaks when used for bequests, and af-
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payments. Hence, it is believed to be better to locate bonds in retirement
accounts which defer taxation, have no use for timing capital gains or
losses, and are ill-suited for bequest planning. In this context, tax efﬁ-
ciency means giving preference to bonds in TDAs whenever possible.
These theoretical ﬁndings translate into the following empirical pre-
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Figure 1.1
Distribution of Portfolio Allocations in TDA and Taxable Accounts in the 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances
a. TDA (tax-deferred account) wealth includes assets in IRA, Keogh, 401k and 403b plans.
Investable tax account wealth excludes checking, but contains almost all other ﬁnancial as-
sets such as stocks, taxable and tex-exempt bonds, U.S. savings bonds, mutual funds, CDs,
and money market accounts. By contrast, Bergstresser and Poterba (2003) also exclude
money market and savings accounts from their deﬁnition of investable taxable assets. Posi-
tive investable wealth households are those with investable wealth in both account habitats.
b. “Equities” in taxable accounts (as well as TDAs) are deﬁned as “low-tax” assets. While this
primarily means stocks and stock mutual funds, it also includes other tax-preferred such as
tax-exempt municipal bonds and U.S. savings bonds. Doing so acknowledges differences in
tax treatment of safe and liquid securities and makes the observed lack of tax-efﬁciency all
the more puzzling.
c. Households in the tax-efﬁcient frontier (segments BC and CD) may hold both bonds and
stocks in their portfolios. Their “low-tax” assets (as deﬁned in b) are kept in taxable ac-
counts, spilling over into TDA only if their desired bond (or “high-tax”) holdings do not
exhaust TDA capacity. All other mixed-asset households are tax-inefﬁcient. The tax-
efﬁcient region is represented by a 10% band around this strict deﬁnition of Tepper and
Black to allow for measurement error.Precautionary Savings Motives and Tax Efﬁciency of Household Portfolios 11
diction: there should never be any equity holdings in TDAs as long as
there are bond holdings in taxable accounts. In the extreme case of un-
limited borrowing in taxable accounts, the specialization of accounts is
complete—the retirement account is always entirely dedicated to
bonds. When borrowing in taxable accounts is limited it is possible to
observe equities in TDAs, provided the overall desired bond holdings
do not exhaust TDA capacity. Conversely, if the overall desired bond
holdings exceed the limits of the retirement account, the spillover goes
in the other direction—the surplus bonds are observed in taxable ac-
counts. Both cases, however, rule out keeping equities in TDAs while
simultaneously holding bonds in taxable accounts.
Observed portfolio allocations do not conform to these predictions.
Figure 1.1 presents data on portfolio choices of U.S. households in the
2001 SCF that had assets in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts. The
horizontal axis represents the share of a tax-deferred account held in
bonds, and the vertical axis represents the share of taxable account held
in equities. Taking bonds and equities to be a short-hand for high- and
low-tax assets for the moment, each of the axes measures the extent to
which tax-appropriate assets are held in each of the two accounts.9 Con-
sequently, points farther away from the origin are more tax-efﬁcient.
The Tepper-Black results suggest that all households should locate
along the outer, tax-efﬁcient, frontier—segments BC where stocks spill
over into TDA, and CD where bonds spill over into the taxable account.
The size of each point is proportional to the number of households mak-
ing this particular portfolio allocation choice, making it easier to assess
the prevalence of tax-efﬁcient portfolio choices. As summarized in table
1.1, among households with positive investable ﬁnancial wealth in both
account types in the 2001 SCF, 4.3 percent had all-stock portfolios, 8.2
percent had all-bond portfolios (both of which would technically be tax
efﬁcient), and an additional 21.9 percent were located on the tax-
efﬁcient frontier.10 The rest of these households—nearly two-thirds in
all—do not adhere to Tepper-Black tax efﬁciency.11 Moreover, the rela-
tive share of tax-inefﬁcient households has been growing steadily over
time, mirroring the rise in stock ownership through tax-deferred retire-
ment plans. The data also suggest that tax-efﬁcient households are
wealthier, on average. Although tax-efﬁcient households make up a
third of the population, they control nearly a half of ﬁnancial wealth.
The top panel of table 1.2summarizes the number of households mak-
ing tax-inefﬁcient portfolio choices by age group and reports the median
and total amounts of mis-located assets in the 2001 SCF. Tax-inefﬁcientportfolio allocations are commonplace in every age group but—as
shown by the earlier work by Bergstresser and Poterba (2004)—the ex-
tent of deviations from tax efﬁciency is fairly limited. In each age group,
a transfer of less than ten thousand dollars would be sufﬁcient to attain
tax efﬁciency for the majority of households.
One way to gauge the dollar cost of observed tax inefﬁciency is by
computing equivalent taxable wealth measures developed by Poterba
(2004). Conceptually, equivalent taxable value of one dollar in TDA as-
sets is given by $z in taxable assets that replicate the after-tax TDA pay-
off at some time T. The value of zdepends on a number of factors—such
as the tax rates on asset returns and TDA withdrawals, the investment
horizon, and the level of returns. Among other things, Poterba (2004)
shows that a dollar in TDA bond holdings generates higher equivalent
taxable wealth than a dollar in TDA equity holdings (i.e., zbonds > zstocks),
quantifying the magnitude of gains from tax-efﬁcient location choices.
Consequently, the cost of tax inefﬁciency can be approximated by the
difference between equivalent taxable wealth measures associated with
the observed portfolio allocations and allocations that follow the
Tepper-Black pecking order rules. To construct hypothetical Tepper-
Black portfolios each dollar in TDAequities is converted into a dollar in
TDA bonds, while the opposite conversion (from bonds to stocks) of
$(1– )/(1 –  st) takes place in the taxable account. Such rebalancing pre-
serves the after-tax exposure to equities and is carried out until there are
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Table 1.1
Classiﬁcation of Portfolio Allocations by Tax Efﬁciency in 1995–2001
1995 1998 2001
N % N % N %
All households (mln.) 99.0 102.5 106.5
Positive investable wealth HHsa 32.8 33.1 43.6 42.6 48.7 45.7
All-bond households: {1,0} 3.0 9.2 3.5 8.0 4.0 8.2
All-stock households: {0,1} 1.9 5.7 1.6 3.8 2.1 4.3
Tax-efﬁcient region HHsb 9.2 28.1 10.6 24.4 10.7 21.9
Tax-inefﬁcient households 18.7 57.0 27.9 63.9 31.9 65.6
Source: 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances
a Positive investable wealth households are those with investable wealth in both account
habitats, as deﬁned in footnote (a) to ﬁgure 1.1.
b Households in the 10% band around the Tepper-Black tax-efﬁcient frontier, as depicted
by the dotted lines in ﬁgure 1.1.either no more equities in TDA or bonds in taxable accounts.12 The re-
sulting TDA portfolio is converted to its taxable equivalent using the
same set of (zbonds, zstocks) factors that were applied to the observed port-
folio. The results of this exercise for a speciﬁc parameterization of z are
reported in the bottom panel of table 1.2.
The ﬁgures in the two leftmost columns of panel B are based on one of
the scenarios reported in table 6 in Poterba (2004). This scenario assumes
bond returns of 4 percent, equity returns of 9 percent (with a dividend
yield of 2 percent and 7 percent rate of capital gains), TDA withdrawal
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Table 1.2
Extent and Cost of Tax Inefﬁciency in a Cross Section of U.S. Households
Panel A. Propensity and extent of tax-inefﬁcient choices
“Mis-located” assets ($)
HHs with positive  Tax-inefﬁcient 
Age group investable wealtha HHsb Total ($ bln) Median ($)
< 30 4.6 M 3.4 M 10.6 778
30–39 10.0 M 7.0 M 61.5 2,646
40–49 14.2 M 10.1 M 180.2 5,222
50–59 10.1 M 7.1 M 189.1 7,005
60–69 5.3 M 2.8 M 101.1 10,462
Panel B. Gains in equivalent taxable wealthc from tax-efﬁcient rebalancing
pre-JGTRRAd post-JGTRRAe
Total ($ bln) Median ($) Total ($ bln) Median ($)
< 30 1.6 125 2.8 230
30–39 7.4 283 13.8 548
40–49 13.2 264 27.9 612
50–59 5.6 140 15.4 491
60–69 0.3 2 1.9 123
Source: 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances
a Positive investable wealth households are those with investable wealth in both account
habitats, as deﬁned in footnote (a) to ﬁgure 1.1.
b Households in the 10% band around the Tepper-Black tax-efﬁcient frontier, as depicted
by the dotted lines in ﬁgure 1.1.
c Equivalent taxable wealth is deﬁned as in Poterba (2004), with speciﬁc parameterization
choices detailed in text.
d Ordinary income tax rate applies to interest income and TDAwithdrawals, capital gains
effectively taxed at 10% (20% statutory rate).
e Ordinary income tax rate applies to TDA withdrawals, to interest income is taxed at the
statutory capital gains rate of 5 or 15%, capital gains have an effective tax burden of 2.5 or
7.5%.at age seventy, the 2001 marginal tax rate schedule, and pre-JGTRRAtax
treatment of capital income. The two rightmost columns differ in as-
suming the post-JGTRRA tax treatment, with dividend income taxed at
the statutory capital gains rate of 5 or 15 percent, and the effective rate
on capital gains set at half the statutory level to reﬂect the value of gain
deferral (Poterba 1998).
Acomparison of these two scenarios reveals that by widening the gap
between tax burdens on stocks and bonds JGTRRAhas substantially in-
creased the cost of tax-inefﬁcient portfolios, more than doubling it in the
aggregate (from twenty-eight to sixty-two billion dollars). Although z
decreases monotonically with age, the costs of tax inefﬁciency are
hump-shaped, reﬂecting the fact that levels of mislocated assets grow
steadily with age. In spite of the high aggregate costs of tax inefﬁciency,
the loss for a median tax-inefﬁcient household is rather limited. Still,
about 2.9 million households in the post-JGTRRA regime (one million
with the pre-JGTRRA tax schedule) abandon at least ﬁve thousand dol-
lars in equivalent taxable wealth. The following section takes a closer
look at one possible explanation for this puzzling behavior.
1.3 Precautionary Dual-Habitat Model of Portfolio Choice
One plausible modeling strategy for explaining why households hold
tax-inefﬁcient portfolios is to introduce further sources of risk and to
emphasize limited accessibility of TDA assets for preretirement con-
sumption. Taken together, nonﬁnancial risk and relative TDAilliquidity
require a tradeoff between tax efﬁciency and asset accessibility. Al-
though holding bonds outside TDAs results in suboptimal portfolio re-
turns, locking away lower-risk assets in TDAs may prove costly if a
household is hit by a bad income shock coinciding with poor market re-
turns.13 As a result, households may choose to hold bonds outside TDA
as means for smoothing their consumption and bonds in TDA as tax-
efﬁcient investment vehicles.
Adual-habitat portfolio model set up in such fashion shares two cen-
tral features of precautionary savings models—uninsurable risk and
credit market imperfections. As shown by Kimball (1990) and Carroll
(1997), prudent households in such environment choose to hold buffer
stocks of assets—which is commonly referred to as precautionary savings
behavior.14 The canonical precautionary savings models did not take a
stand on asset composition of buffer assets. However, later theoretical
(Kimball 1993) and numerical single-habitat studies (Bertaut and
14 AmrominHaliassos 1997) found that precautionary motives lead to less risky port-
folio choices—that is, buffer stocks held in the form of safe and liquid as-
sets. In the context of dual-habitat portfolio allocation models, such safe
and liquid assets could be manifested through tax-inefﬁcient holdings
of bonds outside of retirement accounts.15
Amromin (2003) presented numerical solutions for one such model in
which income risk takes the form of catastrophic low-frequency unem-
ployment spells and households choose the level of consumption, port-
folio composition, and contributions to each account type. Under certain
parameter assumptions this model can generate precautionary portfolio
effects, deﬁned as deviations of portfolio choices of liquidity-constrained
households facing labor income risk from the benchmark of tax efﬁ-
ciency. These effects are predicted to intensify with the strength of
household precautionary motives.
The ﬁrst result of the precautionary dual-habitat model is that it can ac-
commodate tax-efﬁcient behavior for certain households. This is analo-
gous to the results reported in the traditional precautionary savings lit-
erature, whereby even with uninsurable income risk there may be agents
that are either not exposed to that risk or are wealthy enough not to be af-
fected by credit constraints (Carroll 1997; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane
2003). In other words, households with sufﬁciently high overall wealth
can satisfy precautionary needs with equities in the taxable account. Sim-
ilarly, households that are not affected by TDA liquidity restrictions can
afford to concentrate on making tax-efﬁcient location choices.
The other key message of the model is that precautionary portfolio ef-
fects are stronger for households with more pressing precautionary
needs. The intensity of precautionary motives can be captured in a
number of different ways that aggregate into two broad classes: (a) level
of exposure to nondiversiﬁable risk, and (b) tightness of liquidity con-
straints. For example, households that have a higher share of their
wealth conﬁned to TDA are subject to a tighter liquidity constraint—
since less of their overall wealth is readily accessible. For a given level of
labor risk, such households face a higher likelihood of having to make
expensive TDA withdrawals. They attempt to lessen this likelihood by
decreasing the optimal equity share in their taxable account and by cut-
ting back on TDAcontributions. Since these households want to be pru-
dent without completely forgoing the higher return potential of equity
investments, they compensate for lower taxable equity shares with
higher TDA equity shares.16
The ﬁnding that equity shares in the two account types move in op-
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one to construct an alternative empirical test of the effects of such mo-
tives on portfolio composition. As discussed in the introduction, earlier
tests have focused on composition of the overall portfolio and have pro-
duced mixed results. This may not be surprising if households indeed
respond to, say, higher labor income risk by lowering equity shares in
taxable accounts and building up equity shares in TDAs. In this case,
separating taxable and TDAholdings and looking at joint determinants
of asset composition in each account type represents a sharper test. Ad-
mittedly, predictions of a particular numerical model do not rise to the
level of an analytical proof, but they are suggestive enough to merit em-
pirical investigation.
There are two important empirical advantages of using precautionary
dual-habitat portfolio model to produce testable restrictions. The ﬁrst is
that the existing precautionary savings literature provides a clear guide
for mapping model design to the data. In particular, it allows uninsur-
able risk to be deﬁned through a variety of stochastic processes—labor
income, demographic shocks, etc.—all of which can be measured at the
household level. It also identiﬁes household characteristics related to
precautionary savings behavior, such as measures of wealth and ability
to access credit markets.
The second advantage is that the idea of having TDA accessibility re-
strictions bind at the time of adverse labor income shocks conforms well
to the existing tax law. Indeed, liquidity needs that arise from pre-
dictable lifecycle events—such as house purchase and college ex-
penses—are exempt from withdrawal penalties on non employer-
sponsored TDAs (IRAand rollover IRA).17No such exemption exists for
using TDA assets to smooth labor income shocks. If a TDA owner re-
mains employed following a household labor income shock, he or she
can tap assets in employer-sponsored accounts (e.g., 401k and 403b
plans) only by applying for a hardship withdrawal. Such withdrawals
are allowed only in a limited number of circumstances and, even if ap-
proved, trigger early withdrawal penalties. In the case of job loss, any
TDAassets not rolled over into a new TDAwithin sixty days are subject
to a 10 percent penalty. This penalty effectively applies even in the case
of borrowing against TDA, which is a common feature of many retire-
ment plans. Under the current law, a participant that loses her or his job
while carrying a loan balance has to repay the entire loan immediately
in order to avoid penalties. Hence, in any labor income shock scenario,
all ways of accessing any TDAassets for current consumption are costly.
16 Amromin1.4 Empirical Framework
The discussion in the previous section suggested that (1) existence of
precautionary savings motives coupled with TDA accessibility con-
straints may lead some households to forgo tax-efﬁcient portfolio allo-
cations, and (2) stronger precautionary motives may result in greater de-
viations from Tepper-Black efﬁcient portfolio choices. This section maps
these two predictions into speciﬁc empirical tests.
1.4.1 Extensive Margin of Tax Efﬁciency—Which Households Are
Tax Efﬁcient?
As argued earlier, households not subject to precautionary motives or
liquidity restrictions on their TDAholdings have little incentive to sacri-
ﬁce tax-efﬁciency of their portfolio choices. Hence, the likelihood of hold-
ing tax-efﬁcient portfolios is expected to be higher for households that:
(1) have penalty-free access to their retirement wealth—that is, are over
the age of ﬁfty-nine;
(2) have more ﬁnancial or housing wealth, so they are less liquidity con-
strained;
(3) have a lower share of their wealth held in TDAs, which restrict ac-
cessibility;
(4) have less risky labor income processes;
(5) have health insurance coverage for all household members;
In the extensive margin tests all households are broken into two
sets—tax-efﬁcient households that do not simultaneously keep bonds in
taxable accounts and equities in TDAs, and everyone else. This means
that households that completely specialize in a single asset class (i.e.,
whose portfolios are all-stock or all-bonds) are classiﬁed as tax efﬁcient
by default.
1.4.2 Intensive Margin of Tax Efﬁciency—How Tax Efﬁcient
Are Households?
One can think of stronger precautionary savings motives as deriving
from two sources: (1) higher background risk, and (2) tighter liquidity
constraints. These pressures can be captured by variables listed in (1)–
(5) above. It is intuitive that higher income uncertainty and decreased
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lower equity holdings in liquid taxable accounts. The implications for
composition of tax-deferred accounts are less straightforward. On one
hand, high labor income risk may decrease the fraction of TDA in equi-
ties by depressing total stock holdings. On the other, TDA equity expo-
sure can increase in response to rebalancing towards safer buffer hold-
ings outside TDAs. Which effect dominates depends heavily on the
overall location and allocation decision of the household.
The precautionary portfolio effects, based in part on the numerical re-
sults in Amromin (2003), are summarized in table 1.3.
Table 1.3 restates the notion that households with stronger precau-
tionary motives would choose portfolios that are farther away from the
tax-efﬁcient frontier (i.e., have more stocks in TDA and fewer stocks in
taxable accounts). In terms of ﬁgure 1.1, tighter liquidity constraints or
higher background risk (or both) will push portfolio allocations closer to
the origin. As indicated in the table, empirical tests will be extended to
proxies of risk and liquidity beyond those evaluated in the numerical
model. It is worth noting that in addition to measuring liquidity con-
straints, the share of TDAholdings in overall wealth also proxies for the
location choice. Given the simultaneity of contribution and allocation
decisions, it is particularly important to account for the location choice
in evaluating portfolio composition.
These empirical predictions are quite different from those derived
from models that allow only tax-efﬁcient outcomes. For instance, such
models would predict a positive relationship between share of wealth in
TDA and equity shares in both accounts, due to the asset spillovers dis-





Explanatory Variables TDA % in equities Taxable % in equities
Tighter liquidity constraints
(Higher share of wealth in TDA, presence 
of TDA accessibility restrictions, lower 
housing equity)   –
Higher background risk
(Higher probability of unemployment, 
higher volatility of labor income, lack 
of health care coverage)    –strictions or background risk in determining the tax efﬁciency of port-
folio choice.
1.4.2 Data Description
The data used in this study come from three of the latest Surveys of Con-
sumer Finances (conducted in 1995, 1998, and 2001). The surveys are
conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
cover a substantial cross-section of U.S. households in each survey year.
There are 4,299, 4,305, and 4,442 households (respectively) in the sur-
veys studied here. The surveys ask a wide array of questions on every
aspect of household balance sheet—for example, amount and type of
liquid and illiquid assets, nature and value of proprietary business hold-
ings, availability and price of credit, sources of earnings. Of particular
value for studies of household portfolio composition is the fact that the
SCF oversamples wealthy households, which tend to have richer port-
folio structures. Each survey makes available a set of sampling factors
that allow one to reweight the sample to produce population statistics.
Unless otherwise noted, all descriptive statistics utilize population
weights.
The surveys attempt to uncover precise composition of household ﬁ-
nancial portfolios. Unfortunately, information on allocations to nar-
rowly deﬁned asset classes exists only for funds kept in taxable invest-
ment accounts. By contrast, the composition of TDAholdings—whether
individual (like IRA and Keoghs) and employer sponsored (i.e., 401k,
403b)—has to be inferred from categorical responses. For example, the
question on allocation of IRA holdings asks, “How is the money in this
account invested? Is most of it in . . . ?” The question is followed by a
menu list with separate categories for cash, stocks, bond holdings (both
direct and through mutual funds), and several additional options for
combinations of these assets. Clearly, some assumptions are needed to
translate these qualitative measures into dollar ﬁgures. If a respondent
declared that “most holdings” were contained in a single asset category,
the entire account value is assigned to that category. If a combination of
categories is reported, the account value is allocated in equal propor-
tions. The resulting raw allocations of assets in retirement portfolios
closely match those in earlier studies (Ameriks and Zeldes 2004).
The necessity to impute equity shares in retirement accounts in this fash-
ion explains the agglomeration of observations at certain points on the x-
axis in ﬁgure 1.1. For example, a vertical line at 50 percent TDA allocation
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retirement accounts (IRA or Keogh, or 401k or 403b) who reported that
their tax-deferred assets were split between equities and bonds.
In order to conduct empirical tests, key model components need to be
given operational meaning. This chapter deﬁnes investable household
wealth as total quasi-liquid ﬁnancial assets that can be explicitly allo-
cated between investments with equity- or bond-like properties. The
taxable account component of such wealth includes nearly all ﬁnancial
instruments—such as mutual fund investments, savings accounts, and
CDs. It speciﬁcally excludes checking accounts on the grounds that they
are used primarily for transaction purposes, as well as housing and pro-
prietary business wealth, and human capital wealth.18 The tax-deferred
component of investable wealth consists of retirement accounts that al-
low participants to choose asset allocation. This category includes most
of the deﬁned contribution plans (e.g., 401k and 403b)—as well as indi-
vidual retirement accounts such as IRA and Keogh—but it omits im-
puted values of future guaranteed pension income (Social Security and
deﬁned-beneﬁt plans).
A particularly important task is to deﬁne stocks and bonds. Typically,
bonds have been interpreted directly as corporate, municipal, and gov-
ernment bonds traded on ﬁnancial markets. The ownership of such as-
sets is extremely skewed in the population, and they do not nearly ex-
haust the set of ﬁnancial instruments that provide relatively safe return
and are highly liquid. Since this chapter focuses on the precautionary be-
havior of households, this set of assets is augmented with money market
and savings accounts—which face the same tax treatment as conven-
tional bonds. However, to deﬁne tax efﬁciency properly one needs to ac-
count for differences in tax treatment among bond-like assets. In partic-
ular, since municipal bonds and U.S. savings bonds receive preferential
tax treatment, here they are counted as low-tax equities that should be lo-
cated in taxable accounts. Consequently, the share of equities held in tax-
able accounts is deﬁned as the sum of directly held stocks, stock mutual
funds, munis, and U.S. savings bonds, divided by total investable taxable
wealth. This deﬁnition also highlights the puzzle identiﬁed in Shoven
and Sialm (2004) and Poterba, Shoven, and Sialm (2004)—holding munis
in taxable accounts allows households to satisfy their precautionary mo-
tives and be tax-efﬁcient at the same time. Yet, as shown in ﬁgure 1.1, and
analyzed in the following section, households do not follow this practice.
To obtain a measure of conditional moments of labor income pro-
cesses, standard deviations of labor income shocks are computed from
20 Amrominthe 1985–1993 data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The choice of
the functional form for the labor income process and the econometric
method for estimating its components are similar to Carroll and
Samwick (1998) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). The details of estimation,
as well as data selection criteria, are speciﬁed in the Appendix. After con-
ditional moments of labor income are computed for each household in
the sample, they are averaged within each occupation-education group.
Cross-sectional probabilities of unemployment for each such group are
also obtained from the Job Tenure Supplement of the Current Population
Survey. These group means are then used as point estimates of labor in-
come uncertainty for corresponding demographic cells in the SCF.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 An Outline of the Econometric Model
As described in the preceding section, the empirical task is twofold—to
evaluate the choice of whether to be tax-efﬁcient (the extensive margin)
and to evaluate the degree of observed tax-inefﬁciency in household
portfolios (the intensive margin). An econometric analysis of these deci-
sions is complicated by several factors. One of them is that the tax efﬁ-
ciency of portfolios is determined simultaneously with the choice of
how much assets to locate in TDAs. Another is that both the extensive
and the intensive margins of tax-efﬁciency are summarized in the data
by limited variables. In case of the former, the decision is given by a bi-
nary variable. In case of the latter, the degree of tax-inefﬁciency is sum-
marized by the share of taxable and tax-deferred accounts invested in
equities—which by construction are restricted to the [0,1] range. Conse-
quently, an analysis of tax efﬁciency of portfolio choices requires an
econometric model of limited dependent variables with endogenous re-
gressors. The model and the corresponding estimator are speciﬁed ex-
plicitly in the technical Appendix B.
Both the intensive and the extensive margins of tax efﬁciency are
modeled as functions of variables discussed previously. Speciﬁcally,
illiquidity of household wealth due to its TDA holdings is captured by
the share of wealth held in TDA and an indicator of being subject to the
early withdrawal penalty. Labor income risk is proxied by the estimates
of the conditional variance of the log of labor income and of the proba-
bility of unemployment, and an indicator for households with two or
more income earners. As long as these income streams are not perfectly
Precautionary Savings Motives and Tax Efﬁciency of Household Portfolios 21positively correlated, dual-earner households have (ceteris paribus) less
volatile labor income. Indicators of whether the main self-reported mo-
tive for savings is precautionary—whether all members of household
are covered by health insurance—and whether the household has
enough liquid assets to satisfy self-reported liquidity needs serve as ad-
ditional measures of the existence of measurable precautionary mo-
tives.19 Measures of household wealth include both ﬁnancial and hous-
ing assets, and demographic characteristics are captured by education
category dummies and a quadratic in age.
1.5.2 The Location Choice—Determinants of Share of Wealth Held
in TDA
Both the intensive and extensive margin decisions depend on the share of
wealth held in TDA, which is determined simultaneously with portfolio
composition. Although the estimator described in Appendix B is some-
what different, it is helpful to think of a standard approach to dealing with
the resulting endogeneity of the TDA wealth share—a two-stage instru-
mental variable model. Consequently, this subsection looks at the ﬁrst-
stage regression, that of the share of wealth in TDA (swlthTDA) on the
variables listed above and a number of instruments. In addition to its sta-
tistical merits, the estimation of the determinants of swlthTDA—the
proxy for the location decision—is of interest in its own right.
I consider alternative choices of the instrumental variable are consid-
ered: size of the ﬁrm where the head of the household works, household
eligibility for high-limit employer-sponsored retirement plan, and the
size of employer match. Ideally, each of these variables would be related
to the portfolio shares in each account (or the absolute tax efﬁciency)
only through swlthTDA.
This assumption is somewhat contentious for the ﬁrm size instru-
ment. One could argue that households’ job choices are not randomly
distributed across ﬁrm sizes, but rather reﬂect underlying risk prefer-
ences. One way to assess this concern is to look at a self-reported mea-
sure of willingness to take ﬁnancial risks—available in the SCF. Table 1.4
displays the means of various risk-taking categories by ﬁrm size. There
is no strong evidence that conditional means of household attitudes to-
ward ﬁnancial risk vary with size of ﬁrms that employ them. This is par-
ticularly true of the extreme categories—“willing to take very high in-
vestment risk” and “unwilling to take any risk.”20
In contrast, the other two instrumental variables—household eli-
22 Amromingibility and the size of employer match—are less likely to inﬂuence port-
folio choice directly.21 An accurate measure of eligibility can be con-
structed from a number of SCF questions about features of employment-
related pension coverage. This chapter follows the methodology in Pence
(2006) to identify households that are eligible for (but do not necessarily
participate in) high-limit deﬁned contribution retirement plans. An
important addition is the extension of the deﬁnition of eligibility to self-
employed households. Under the current tax code, unincorporated busi-
nesses have the right to open IRA-type accounts that have high contri-
bution limits and nearly unrestricted choice of investments.22
Given potential drawbacks of these instruments, table 1.5 estimates
two versions of the regression for swlthTDA. The model is estimated on
a subset of households that have both taxable and tax-deferred accounts,
in order to avoid including trivial zero-portfolio choices. Not surpris-
ingly, the share of wealth in TDAhas a strong positive relationship with
each of the three instruments that proxy for availability and attractive-
ness of employer-sponsored retirement accounts whose contribution
limits are much higher than IRAs. Also, as expected, strict limits on con-
tributions to retirement accounts result in a strong inverse relationship
between the level of wealth and its share in TDAs.23 Households that
save primarily for precautionary reasons keep less of their wealth in
TDAs, as do those that are subject to early TDA withdrawal penalties
(although the latter relationship has only marginal statistical signiﬁ-
cance). As indicated by the comparison of the two panels of table 1.5,
these results are quite robust to the choice of instrument.
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Table 1.4
Distribution of Self-Reported Willingness to Take Financial Risks, by Firm Size
Firm Size (number of employees)
Share responding as: <10 10–19 20–99 100–499 >500
Take very high investment risks (%) 7.9 5.6 6.9 5.3 5.9
Take above average risks (%) 23.2∗∗ 25.1∗ 27.9 27.4 31.5
Take average risks (%) 51.5∗ 50.5 44.8 48.6 46.1
Take no risks (%) 17.3 18.8 20.4 18.7 16.4
Source: 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Note: sample is restricted to households with positive investable wealth in both account
types.
∗ Difference of means between a given size category and largest ﬁrms (>500) statistically
signiﬁcant at 5% level.
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1% level.Table 1.5
Determinants of Location Choice
Panel A Panel B
Robust Robust 
Standard Standard Eq (1) 
Regressors Coefﬁcient Error Coefﬁcient Error group
Employer match (in ppt) 0.741 ∗∗∗ (0.075) 0.754 ∗∗∗ (0.097) IV
Eligible for 401k (1   yes)a 0.072 ∗∗∗ (0.012)
Firm size 0.016 ∗∗∗ (0.002)
Subject to early withdrawal penalty 
(1   yes) –0.028 ∗ (0.017) –0.031 ∗ (0.016) M
Financial wealthb –0.032 ∗∗∗ (0.008) –0.037 ∗∗∗ (0.003) W
Housing wealthb –0.004 (0.003) –0.003 (0.009)
Cond. std. deviation of labor income –0.211 ∗∗∗ (0.031) –0.146 ∗∗∗ (0.026) L
Probability of being unemployed 0.048 (0.166) –0.118 (0.172)
Health care coverage dummy 
(1   yes) –0.013 (0.015) –0.013 (0.016)
Dual earner household dummy 
(1   yes) 0.031 ∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.036 ∗∗∗ (0.008) H
Precautionary savings household –0.029 ∗∗∗ (0.008) –0.030 ∗∗∗ (0.007)
Enough assets to cover liquidity 
needs (1   yes) –0.220 ∗∗∗ (0.008) –0.216 ∗∗∗ (0.009)
Age of head of household 0.021 ∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.021 ∗∗∗ (0.002) D
Age -squared (  10–2) –0.021 ∗∗∗ (0.002) –0.022 ∗∗∗ (0.002)
Education (no high school diploma) –0.059 ∗∗∗ (0.020) –0.054 ∗∗∗ (0.020)
Education (some college) –0.041 ∗∗∗ (0.012) –0.041 ∗∗∗ (0.012)
Education (college or more) –0.026 ∗∗∗ (0.003) –0.029 ∗∗∗ (0.100)
Number of dependents –0.006 ∗∗ (0.003) –0.005 ∗ (0.003)
Availability of DB plan at work 0.010 (0.007) –0.009 (0.007)
1995 year dummy –0.026 ∗∗∗ (0.008) –0.022 ∗∗∗ (0.008)
1998 year dummy –0.007 (0.008) –.006 (0.008)
Constant 0.248 0.250
Mean share of wealth in TDA 0.405 0.405
N (obs.) 6,476 6,476
Measure of ﬁt (adjusted-R2) 0.219 0.221
Source: 1995–2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances
Notes: 2-stage instrumental variable/AGLS model, with ﬁrst-stage regression coefﬁcients. Depen-
dent variable is the share of ﬁnancial wealth held in TDA.The two panels differ in the choice of an in-
strumental variable for the endogenous share of wealth invested in TDA. Panel Auses 401k eligibil-
ity (and employer contribution match), while panel B uses ﬁrm size.
a Eligible for any high contribution limit, self-directed retirement plan such as 401k, 403b, Keogh,
SEP-IRA, etc. 
b  -transformation applied to wealth measures
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.Notably, the share of wealth in TDAs is also found to depend nega-
tively on the level of risk in household’s labor income. As conditional
standard deviation of the log of labor income declines from its 75th per-
centile value (0.42) to 25th percentile (0.20), the share of wealth held in-
side TDA increases by between 3.1 to 4.5 percentage points (using coef-
ﬁcient estimates in panels A and B). Empirically, the shift from 75th to
25th percentile of labor risk can be thought of as moving from the stan-
dard deviation of labor income growth associated with college-
educated entrepreneurs to that of high-school-educated clerical and ad-
ministrative support workers. Households that can rely on dual labor
income streams also hold a higher share of their wealth in TDA. These
ﬁndings are important because they suggest that the location decision of
a household is an active choice variable inﬂuenced by the level of un-
certainty in labor income, and not just a deterministic function of house-
hold wealth. That is, of the two households with identical wealth levels,
the one with greater income uncertainty will have contributed less of its
wealth to the tax-deferred retirement account.
1.5.3 Which Households Are More Likely to Be Tax Efﬁcient?
At an extreme, all households that are not subject to TDA withdrawal
penalties would have fully tax-efﬁcient portfolios. Although the data
are inevitably more ambiguous, there is clear evidence in support of this
conjecture. Whereas nearly 60 percent of households with positive in-
vestable wealth aged sixty and above maintain tax-efﬁcient portfolios,
only 32 percent of those below this age threshold are tax efﬁcient.
To account for other factors inﬂuencing the choice of whether to be tax
efﬁcient, we estimate a probit variant of the model described in Appendix
B. The estimated coefﬁcients of this model are presented in table 1.6.24
Analogous with deﬁnitions in table 1.1 and ﬁgure 1.1, the dependent vari-
able takes on a value of one if household portfolio lies in the 10 percent
band around the tax-efﬁcient frontier. The results are broadly consistent
with the hypotheses put forth in section 1.4.1. In particular, households
with higher values of swlthTDA are signiﬁcantly less likely to maintain
tax-efﬁcient portfolios. Departing from its mean sample value of 40 per-
cent, each percentage point increase in the share of wealth held in TDAis
associated with a 1.2 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of hold-
ing a tax-efﬁcient portfolio. All else equal, households with a greater share
of wealth in retirement accounts are more liquidity constrained—which
increases the odds of tapping TDAfunds early to smooth income shocks.
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Which Households Are Tax Efﬁcient?
Standard Marginal Eq  (1) 
Regressors Coefﬁcient Error effecta group
Share of wealth in TDA –3.161 ∗∗∗ (0.429) –1.237 M
Subject to early withdrawal penalty 
(1   yes) –0.175 ∗∗ (0.086) –0.069
Financial wealthb 0.090 ∗∗ (0.045) 0.035 W
Housing wealthb –0.010 (0.017) –0.004
Cond. std. deviation of labor income –0.419 ∗∗∗ (0.155) –0.164 L
Probability of being unemployed 0.270 (0.901) 0.106
Dual earner household dummy 
(1   yes) 0.008 (0.046) 0.003
Health care coverage dummy 
(1   yes) –0.064 (0.083) –0.025 H
Precautionary savings household –0.063 (0.043) –0.025
Enough assets to cover liquidity 
needs (1   yes) –0.612 ∗∗∗ (0.104) –0.239
Age of head of household 0.041 ∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.016 D
Age -squared (  10–2) –0.038 ∗∗ (0.015) –0.015
Education (no high school diploma) –0.126 (0.112) –0.049
Education (some college) –0.214 ∗∗∗ (0.066) –0.082
Education (college or more) –0.144 ∗∗∗ (0.055) –0.056
Number of dependents –0.008 (0.016) –0.003
Availability of DB plan at work –0.065 ∗ (0.039) –0.026
1995 year dummy 0.098 ∗∗ (0.047) 0.039
1998 year dummy 0.024 (0.044) 0.009
Constant 0.572
N (obs.) 6,469
Measure of ﬁt (pseudo-R2) 0.042
Source: 1995–2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances
Note: 2-SIV/AGLS probit model of tax-efﬁcient portfolio choice, estimates of structural coefﬁcients.
Dependent variable: 1 if household portfolio is “tax-efﬁcient,” 0 otherwise. A tax-efﬁcient portfolio
is one that contains all “high-tax” assets in tax-deferred accounts (TDA), while “low-tax” assets are
held in taxable accounts (CSA). “Low-tax” assets are deﬁned here as equities and municipal bonds
held directly or through mutual funds, and U.S. savings bonds. A portfolio is considered to be tax-
efﬁcient if at least 90% of asset value in each of the accounts is allocated in the manner described
above.
a Marginal effects evaluated at the mean for continuous variables, or as discrete changes from 0 to 1
for dummies.
b  -transformation applied to wealth measures
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.One way to avoid this is by holding tax-inefﬁcient portfolios, as implied
by the negative coefﬁcient estimate. Being subject to early withdrawal
penalties remains important in the multivariate setting, decreasing the
likelihood of tax-efﬁciency by about 7 percentage points.
The hypotheses regarding the effects of wealth and labor income risk
receive somewhat mixed support in the data. Although households
with more ﬁnancial wealth are more likely to be tax efﬁcient, this analy-
sis has failed to detect an independent effect of housing wealth. Simi-
larly, standard deviation of the log of labor income is estimated to have
a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect on household tax efﬁciency.
However, other measures of labor income risk do not generate statisti-
cally identiﬁable effects—and neither does health insurance coverage.
Still, none of these coefﬁcient estimates is inconsistent with the hypoth-
esis of an inverse relationship between the precautionary savings mo-
tives and likelihood of portfolio tax efﬁciency.
Households that have sufﬁcient taxable assets to satisfy their self-
reported precautionary needs are found less likely to hold tax-efﬁcient
portfolios. Controlling for total ﬁnancial wealth, such households are char-
acterized by high equity holdings in both account types. Consequently, the
only way for such households to avoid being labeled “tax inefﬁcient” is
through holding very little (less than 10 percent) of their taxable accounts
in bondlike assets—which few of them do. The puzzling ﬁnding of the
likelihood of tax efﬁciency declining monotonically with age (until the age
of sixty) has its explanation in a similar source. The age proﬁle of stock mar-
ket participation rises quickly through the peak earnings years (Ameriks
and Zeldes 2004; Banks, Blundell, and Smith 2004). In recent years, initial
equity ownership occurred primarily through employer-sponsored TDAs
(Gale and Pence 2006). These TDA equity holdings coupled with taxable
money market accounts accumulated by households early on in their life-
cycle, lead to an association between tax-inefﬁciency and increases in eq-
uity participation with age. This mechanism is also the likely source for a
strong negative time trend in tax efﬁciency, as much of the increase in the
number of positive ﬁnancial wealth households between 1995 and 2001
could be attributed to TDAparticipation (see table 1.1).
1.5.4 What Determines the Degree of Tax Inefﬁciency in
Household Portfolios?
The above analysis of the stark binary choice of whether to hold tax-
efﬁcient portfolios highlights the key reasons for empirical shortfalls of
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interest is the extent of household tax inefﬁciency. The investigation of
this question can take two distinct forms. Bergstresser and Poterba (2004)
provide a comprehensive analysis of the absolute magnitudes of misal-
located assets, which are directly related to estimates of ﬁnancial losses
resulting from tax inefﬁciency. Taking a somewhat different focus, this
chapter looks to identify speciﬁc causes for deviations of household port-
folios from tax-efﬁcient benchmarks by analyzing portfolio composition
in each of the two account types. This approach also provides a novel test
of the effects of precautionary motives on portfolio choices.
Portfolio allocations in both accounts are modeled jointly, in order to
account for simultaneity of such choices. This is accomplished by choos-
ing a bivariate tobit model with correlated error structure, where error
terms in each equation include unobserved (or omitted) household-
speciﬁc factors. The resulting econometric model is speciﬁed fully in
Appendix B.
Portfolio Choice in Taxable Account The estimation results of the bi-
variate tobit model of portfolio choice are presented in table 1.7. The left
panel shows coefﬁcient estimates for portfolio choice in the taxable ac-
count. The estimated coefﬁcients are of correct sign and most are statis-
tically signiﬁcant. As hypothesized in section 1.3.2, households with
higher values of swlthTDA have lower equity shares in their taxable
portfolios. This effect has strong economic signiﬁcance—moving a
household from the 25th percentile of swlthTDA (0.12) to the 75th per-
centile (0.66) while holding wealth levels unchanged would decrease
the equity share in taxable account by 18.5 percentage points. Being sub-
ject to withdrawal penalties is found to have a negative, though not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, effect on the taxable account equity shares. In con-
trast, measures of labor income uncertainty have strong negative effects
on the share of taxable portfolio dedicated to equities. The smaller mag-
nitude of marginal effects of these regressors (e.g., increasing standard
deviation of the log of wages from the 25th to the 75th percentile value
leads to a decline in equity share of 2.4 percentage points) is not sur-
prising in light of the results in the previous section. Holding more
housing wealth (and hence having better access to credit markets) is as-
sociated with higher taxable equity shares, but having health insurance
coverage (and thus being exposed to less background risk) is not. An-
other interesting ﬁnding is that households saving primarily for pre-
cautionary motives have somewhat less equity exposure in their taxable
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How Tax Efﬁcient Are Households?
Panel B. Tax-deferred
(TDA) portfolio Panel A. Taxable portfolio
Standard Standard 
Regressors Coefﬁcient Error Coefﬁcient Error
Share of wealth in TDA –0.343 ∗∗∗ (0.128) 0.506 ∗∗∗ (0.153)
Subject to early withdrawal penalty 
(1   yes) –0.032 (0.030) 0.051 ∗ (0.028)
Financial wealtha 0.299 ∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.133 ∗∗∗ (0.015)
Housing wealtha 0.012 ∗∗ (0.005) 0.004 (0.006)
Cond. std. deviation of labor income  –0.117 ∗∗ (0.050) 0.082 ∗ (0.050)
Probability of being unemployed –0.570 ∗∗ (0.262) –0.158 (0.272)
Dual earner household dummy 
(1   yes) 0.023 ∗ (0.014) 0.008 (0.016)
Health care coverage dummy (1  yes) –0.036 (0.022) –0.055 ∗∗ (0.028)
Precautionary savings household –0.039 ∗∗∗ (0.013) –0.008 (0.014)
Enough assets to cover liquidity 
needs (1   yes) 0.146 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.148 ∗∗∗ (0.037)
Age of head of household –0.012 ∗∗∗ (0.004) –0.014 ∗∗∗ (0.005)
Age -squared (  10–2) 0.006 (0.005) 0.006 (0.005)
Education (no high school diploma) –0.047 (0.031) 0.023 (0.034)
Education (some college)  0.025 (0.019) 0.080 ∗∗∗ (0.022)
Education (college or more) 0.057 ∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.080 ∗∗∗ (0.018)
Number of dependents  0.005 (0.005)
Availability of DB plan at work 0.028 ∗∗ (0.013)
1995 year dummy  0.020 (0.014) –0.095 ∗∗∗ (0.016)
1998 year dummy 0.030 ∗∗ (0.013) –0.024 (0.015)
Constant –0.180 0.251
Correlation (εCSA, εTDA) 0.21 ∗∗∗
N (obs.) 6,476 6,476
Nonlimit observations 4,914 5,152
Source: 1995–2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances 
Note: 2-SIV/AGLS Bivariate tobit model of portfolio choice, estimates of structural coefﬁcients. De-
pendent variables: share of an account type (taxable or TDA) held in equities. A tax-efﬁcient house-
hold would be expected to hold a higher fraction of its taxable account in equities and a lower frac-
tion of its tax-deferred account (TDA) in equities. Hence, higher values of regressors that have a
positive sign in panel A and a negative sign in panel B indicate more tax-efﬁcient portfolio choices.
a  -transformation applied to wealth measures
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.portfolios, even after controlling for numerous proxy measures of such
motives. While the results in panel A are suggestive of the importance
of the strength of precautionary motives, one needs to consider them
jointly with those for the TDAportfolio choice in order to test model pre-
dictions.
Portfolio Choice in TDA The estimated parameters for TDAportfolio
allocations are shown in panel B of table 1.7. The estimates provide qual-
iﬁed support for the precautionary savings channel of moving house-
holds away from Tepper-Black tax efﬁciency.
The share of wealth held in TDAis estimated to have a strong positive
effect on TDA equity allocations. This result is particularly important
given the ﬁnding of an opposite relationship between equity share and
location in the taxable account. Such differential relationship between
location and allocation choices in the two account types is a distin-
guishing feature of the precautionary portfolio model that is able to gen-
erate tax-inefﬁcient behavior.25 Another key result is that being subject
to early withdrawal penalties increases TDA equity shares (p-value of
0.066). Even though the coefﬁcient estimate of this regressor in panel A
is not statistically signiﬁcant, the opposite signs of the effects of TDA
penalties on equity shares in the two account types are consistent with
the precautionary model. Similarly, positive effects of conditional stan-
dard deviation of the log of wages on TDA equity share are in contrast
to their negative relationship with the share of taxable account held
in equities (again, the estimate is only marginally signiﬁcant, with a
p-value of 0.09). However, the effects of other measures of household la-
bor income risk and of housing wealth are not statistically signiﬁcant. In
general, the precision of coefﬁcient estimates of the TDAportfolio choice
is markedly lower than that in the taxable portfolio choice. This can be
at least partially attributed to the necessity to impute TDA portfolio
composition from a small set of discrete responses. As can be seen in ﬁg-
ure 1.1, there is much less dispersion along the x-axis that captures TDA
portfolio allocations. Such agglomeration of TDA portfolio choices
masks important cross-sectional heterogeneity that could be used to
identify the effects of individual regressors.
Finally, the bivariate tobit procedure estimates a strong positive cor-
relation between the two error terms. One explanation for this is the
presence of zero-limit (or no-equity) households—unobserved factors
that inﬂuence household participation in equity markets are likely to
work in the same direction in both habitats. For example, households
30 Amrominthat already incurred the costs of learning about the stock market are
more likely to own equities in both accounts. Taken together, the empir-
ical estimates of the determinants of equity shares in the two account
types suggest that precautionary savings motives play an active role in
household portfolio choices and contribute to frequent departures from
the Tepper-Black standard of tax efﬁciency.
1.6 Conclusion
Observed portfolio choices in taxable and tax-deferred account habitats
are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of Tepper-Black dual-
habitat models. Although Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) show that the
extent of deviations from the Tepper-Black optimum is fairly limited, the
fact that households effectively leave money on the table is puzzling. One
possible explanation for observing relatively safe but high-tax-burden
assets like bonds in households’ taxable accounts derives from limited
TDAaccessibility, which makes it costly to smooth bad income shocks by
tapping one’s retirement savings. This chapter presents empirical evi-
dence from the SCF suggesting that precautionary considerations can
help to explain existing patterns of asset allocation within and between
TDA and taxable accounts. These ﬁndings augment the existing empiri-
cal literature on portfolio effects of precautionary motives by focusing on
account-speciﬁc responses to limited liquidity and uninsurable risk.
The chapter also highlights the importance of distinguishing between
account habitats in future studies of household ﬁnancial decision-
making. Existing institutional differences in accessibility and tax treat-
ment—as well as distinct savings motives for each of the two account
types—may be helpful in resolving several empirical puzzles. Indeed,
the dramatic differences in age proﬁles of equity participation and port-
folio composition in the two account types could provide insight into rea-
sons for nonparticipation in equity markets or to assess the degree of re-
sponsiveness to various tax incentives like the step-up in basis at death.
Finally, this chapter is relevant for evaluating several policy questions
pertaining to the rules that govern tax-deferred savings plans and pos-
sible behavioral responses to changes in these rules. In particular, it may
help to enrich the structure of budget forecasting models by identifying
factors that affect household location and allocation choices in taxable
and tax-deferred accounts. In particular, the results suggest that relax-
ing early withdrawal penalties may lead to more tax-efﬁcient TDAallo-
cations, lowering tax revenues and affecting ﬂows into and out of tax-
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important role for self-directed retirement savings in national pension
systems throughout the industrialized world, improving the under-
standing of household choices in this arena is likely to remain an im-
portant item on the agenda of policymakers and researchers alike.
Appendix A
Estimation of Non-Financial Income Moments from PSID
The methodology for estimating conditional moments of non ﬁnancial
income is very similar to Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and Carroll and
Samwick (1998). The income process of household is a product of a per-
manent component and a transitory shock: Y t   P tεt, where log perma-
nent shock follows a random walk with a drift. Switching to log nota-
tion, we obtain:
yt   pt   εt; pt   gt   pt 1   ut; εt ~ N(0,  ε
2); ut ~ N(0,  2
u), (1)
where both ut and εt are i.i.d. and are mutually uncorrelated at all leads
and lags. The drift term (gt) is predictable on the basis of information
available at time t – 1—that is, gt   f(Zt–1).
Differencing of the log income produces:
yt   yt 1   gt   ut   εt   εt 1; (2)
yt   yt 2   gt   gt 1   ut   ut 1   εt   εt 2. (3)
The d-year conditional variance of the log of income, V(yt⏐yt–1, . . . , yt–d,
Zt–1, . . . , Zt–d), is then given by vd   d 2
u   2 ε
2.
In order to remove the predictable drift component, I regress de-
trended ﬁrst difference of log non ﬁnancial income on a vector of vari-
ables known at time t – 1: age of household head, age-squared, occupa-
tion and industry dummies, number of children, as well as race, marital,
and education category dummies. The resulting residuals are then used
to construct sample one- and two-year conditional variances of the log of
labor income for each household: v1and v2. With these estimates in hand,
one can theoretically separate sample variances of permanent and tran-
sitory shock components. However, this is not attempted here, and an es-
timate of one-year conditional variance is used as a regressor.
For estimation, 1985–1993 PSID data is used—restricting the sample
to households that remained intact over the entire sample period and
32 Amrominprovided complete responses in each of the survey years. Further,
households in poverty and Latino subsamples are also excluded. The re-
sulting sample consists of 2,404 households, each of which has nine ob-
servations. When estimating the predictable component of labor income
growth rate, records which show unemployment spells of more than
four weeks as well as records with suspiciously low nonﬁnancial in-
come relative to household sample average ( 10%) are excluded.
Sample variances are computed for all households that did not have un-
employment spells in any of the nine sample years. These variances are
regressed on a vector of education and occupation dummies, and the re-




As described in section 1.5, an analysis of tax-efﬁciency of portfolio
choices that allows for the simultaneity of the overall location decision
requires econometric models of limited dependent variables with en-
dogenous regressors. In the case of the extensive margin choice
(whether to be tax efﬁcient), the dependent variable is binary. In the case
of the intensive margin choice (the degree of tax efﬁciency), the two de-
pendent variables are given by the share of each of the two account types
invested in equities, restricted to the [0,1] range. The resulting econo-
metric model has a common structure given by:
yi∗    1    2Mi    3Wi    4Li    5Hi    6Di   ui, i   1, . . . , N, (B1)
where for the extensive margin choice the observed dependent variable
is deﬁned as:
yi   1 if yi∗ > 0, 0 otherwise, (B2)
and for the intensive margin choice the observed dependent variables
specialize to:
yi,k   y∗
i,k if y∗
i,k ∈ (0,1); (B3)
yi,k   0 if y∗
i,k   0; yi,k   1 if y∗
i,k   1; k ∈ {TDA, taxable}.
In both cases, one of the key explanatory variables—the share of wealth
held in TDA (swlthTDA)—is an endogenously determined proxy of lo-
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swlthTDA is assumed to be related to a vector of instruments (X1 X2),
where X1 denotes variables that are included in equation (B1). In con-
trast, X2contains variables that affect the dependent variable(s) in equa-
tion (B1) only through their correlation with swlthTDA and are thus ex-
cluded from equation (B1):
swlthTDAi    1Xi1    2Xi2   εi, (u, ε) ~ MVN( , Σ). (B4)
The set of explanatory variables is broken into several subsets for con-
venience. Variable M is a subset of variables that proxy for illiquidity of
household wealth due to its TDAholdings—share of wealth in TDAand
an indicator of being subject to the early withdrawal penalty. Variable W
consists of ﬁnancial and housing wealth. Variable L contains estimates
of the conditional volatility of the log of labor income by occupation and
education, derived from PSID data. The regressors in L also include the
probability of unemployment estimated for the same demographic
groups using CPS data and a dummy variable for households with two
or more income earners. Variable Hcontains additional indicators of the
extent to which a household may be subject to precautionary motives.
These binary variables capture whether the main self-reported motive
for savings is precautionary, whether all members of household are cov-
ered by health insurance, and whether the household has enough liquid
assets to satisfy self-reported liquidity needs. Finally, D represents a
subset of demographic variables—education category dummies and a
quadratic in age.
The model in (B1)–(B4) is estimated on the basis of Newey’s (1987) es-
timator for limited dependent variable models with endogenous ex-
planatory variables—which is a variant of Amemiya’s (1978) general-
ized least squares (AGLS). In Newey’s estimator, parameters of the
limited dependent variable equation (such as equation (B1)) are esti-
mated by maximum likelihood after substituting for the endogenous
variable with a reduced form equation (such as equation (B4)). The
structural parameters of equation (B1) are then backed out via a gener-
alized least squares approach.
An additional complication of the model in (B1)–(B4) is that the re-
gressors in Lare themselves generated on the basis of household labor in-
come characteristics obtained from additional data sources—the Cur-
rent Population Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. To
account for sampling error in the generated regressors, I restate the
AGLS estimator in the GMM framework for multistep estimators
34 Amromin(Hansen 1982).26 The details of estimation are available on request, but
two points can be made here. The ﬁrst is that most of the moment condi-
tions in the estimator can be assumed to be mutually independent, since
they arecomputed using data from three different surveys. Since it is un-
likely that same people were chosen for participation in these surveys,
the assumption of independence is not unreasonable. As a result, the
complexity of the estimator is greatly reduced. The second point is
that all information from PSID and CPS data needed to correct the 
variance-covariance matrix of structural coefﬁcients   is contained in
consistent estimators of Var( ), where  is a vector of coefﬁcients from re-
gressions of labor volatility measures on occupation and education dum-
mies. The size of these estimated Var( ) matrices is one of the key deter-
minants of the magnitude of corrections for generated regressors. Both of
the other data samples—PSID and CPS—are rather large.27 Given their
size and the nature of parameter vectors (simple demographic cell
means), it is not surprising that both  -vectors are very precisely esti-
mated. Consequently, the correction to standard errors that is due to the
presence of generated regressors is very small. While accounting for the
effect of such regressors remains an important theoretical concern, its
practical implications are quite limited in the current application.
The extensive margin of tax-efﬁciency is, thus, modeled as a probit
variant of (B1)–(B4) with the dependent variable given by (B2). The in-
tensive margin decision is described by portfolio allocations in both ac-
counts, which are modeled jointly to account for simultaneity of such
choices. The resulting econometric model in (B1)–(B4) specializes to a bi-
variate tobit model with correlated error structure, where error terms in
each equation (ui
TDA, ui
taxable) include unobserved or omitted household-
speciﬁc factors. The bivariate vector of dependent variables in this
model is deﬁned by (B3). The results for the two margins of tax-
efﬁciency are summarized in table 1.6 and 1.7, respectively, with
Newey’s asymptotically efﬁcient estimates of structural coefﬁcients.
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Notes
1. For example, Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004) estimate utility costs of tax-
inefﬁcient allocations to be up to ﬁfteen percent of total investable wealth for young
households.
2. These data are from the U.S. Flow of Funds, tables L.118.c and L.225.i. Self-directed re-
tirement accounts include employer-sponsored deﬁned contribution plans such as 401(k)
and 403(b), similar plans for the self-employed such as Keogh and SEP-IRA, and individ-
ual retirement savings accounts such as Regular and Roth IRA.
3. For the remainder of this paper, tax efﬁciency of portfolio allocations is deﬁned in the
narrow sense of Tepper-Black. An allocation is said to be tax-efﬁcient if a strict pecking or-
der is observed—the highest-taxed asset is always located in the tax-preferred habitat be-
fore any lower-taxed assets can be placed there. Relative to this benchmark, any allocation
that violates this pecking order is labeled tax inefﬁcient.
4. Other recent papers have also attempted to address the discord between theory and
data in a variety of ways. For example, Huang (2001) uses lumpy expenditure needs that
are unavoidable at certain points over the lifecycle, while Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang
(2004) add uncertain labor income and lumpy consumption shocks. These models are dis-
cussed in detail in Amromin (2003).
5. Garlappi and Huang (2006) offer an alternative and novel mechanism for generating
non-Tepper-Black portfolios. Starting with the premise that Tepper-Black tax efﬁciency
maximizes the tax subsidy inherent in TDA savings (Poterba 2004), they show that risk-
averse households facing borrowing constraints are concerned not only with the level of
such tax subsidy, but also with its volatility. Consequently, they may opt to reduce the
volatility of the subsidy by placing both bonds and stocks in each of the two account types.
Although Garlappi and Huang (2006) contains interesting empirical predictions, they can-
not be readily tested with available data.
6. However, if TDA access is unrestricted, the precautionary motives can be satisﬁed by
assets in either habitat and tax efﬁciency of allocations need not be violated. This should
be the case with the Canadian system, which openly treats tax-favored registered retire-
ment savings plans (RRSP) as just another means to smooth consumption.
7. An especially popular formulation of this test has been to look for a negative relation-
ship between the share of equities in household portfolio and the level of its labor income
risk, as shown numerically in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Viceira (2001).
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and Heaton and Lucas (2000a) ﬁnd strong effects, but Guiso, Jap-
pelli, and Terlizzesse (1996) conclude that labor income risk has small effects on portfolio
choice, while Hochguertel (2003) ﬁnds that the sign of these effects may even occasionally
be positive in his sample of Dutch households. Bertaut and Haliassos (1995) also ﬁnd that
those in high-risk occupations (deﬁned as occupations with higher and more variable un-
employment rates) are less likely to own any stocks.
36 Amromin8. Although the empirical analysis is carried out using U.S. data, the same paradigm
would hold true in any country that (1) imposes accessibility restrictions on tax-favored
accounts, and (2) has lower tax burdens on equities, as compared with less risky bonds.
One prominent example of such setting is the United Kingdom.
9. A detailed deﬁnition of low- and high-tax assets is provided in section 1.4.
10. As noted in the footnote to table 1.1, investable ﬁnancial wealth includes ﬁnancial as-
sets outside of checking accounts, as well as assets in self-directed individual retirement
savings plans. The choice of which assets should be considered investable and which in-
vestment choices should be regarded as tax-efﬁcient will be addressed in detail in the next
section. Furthermore—in order to account for likely measurement error—the deﬁnition
of tax-efﬁciency is relaxed to allow for a 10 percent interval around the tax-efﬁcient fron-
tier as indicated by dotted lines in ﬁgure 1.1.
11. These proportions pertain only to households with positive ﬁnancial wealth in both
account types. As seen in table 1.1, the share of such households in the United States has
been growing rapidly from only 33 percent in 1995 to nearly 46 percent in 2001, largely as
a result of increasing popularity of tax-deferred retirement accounts.
12. Here,  corresponds to the marginal tax rate (and the tax rate on bond holdings), while
 stis the effective tax rate on stocks. Intuitively, since taxable equities are less risky than eq-
uities contained in TDA, risk-preserving tax-efﬁcient rebalancing produces higher after-
tax equity holdings: $(1 –  )/(1 –  st) as compared to $(1 –  ).
13. Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) provide a detailed analysis of household portfolio
choice under liquidity constraints. The illiquidity of TDAaccounts potentially has an even
stronger effect on the ultimate location and allocation choice in the presence of ﬁrm con-
sumption commitments such as housing. Chetty and Szeidl (forthcoming) and Fratantoni
(2001) study the effect of such commitments on household portfolio choice and conclude
that they may explain low (or non existent) equity holdings of households.
14. Precautionary savings are commonly deﬁned as the incremental savings that a
liquidity-constrained household makes when it faces labor income risk, compared to the
certain income scenario. Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) empirically conﬁrmed the
existence of such savings, although the results were somewhat sensitive to measures 
of savings.
15. Simulation results indicate that under plausible speciﬁcations of stochastic income
processes, buffer stocks need to be not only liquid but also include safe assets like bonds.
Still, stronger theoretical results are needed to establish conditions under which buffer
stocks necessarily contain riskless assets.
16. The model in Amromin (2003) can directly accommodate only a few avenues for in-
creasing precautionary savings motives, such as the share of wealth in illiquid TDA ac-
counts, degree of their illiquidity (early withdrawal penalty), and probability of unem-
ployment shocks. The empirical analysis will extend to additional measures of
precautionary concerns, such as housing equity and volatility of labor income.
17. Both exemptions became law in 1997 as a part of The Taxpayer Relief Act. Education
withdrawals can apply towards tuition, as well as room and board, and they can be taken
out for oneself, one’s children, or grandchildren. There is not a ﬁxed dollar limit on such
withdrawals and as long as all of it goes toward qualiﬁed education expenses no penalties
are due. The housing exemption applies to ﬁrst-time homebuyers and is capped at ten
thousand dollars for each of the partners. First-time is deﬁned as not having owned a pri-
mary residence for the past 2 years.
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which serves an important role in relaxing liquidity constraints through home equity
loans and lines of credit. I control for housing wealth in empirical work but it does not en-
ter the deﬁnition for investable wealth. Heaton and Lucas (2000b) demonstrated that pro-
prietary business holdings are an important component of household portfolios. Such
holdings are typically less liquid and more volatile than purely ﬁnancial assets. Although
the current version of the paper excludes these holdings, it would be useful to conduct ro-
bustness checks on the deﬁnition of wealth in the future.
19. Self-reported liquidity needs were determined from responses to the following ques-
tion: “About how much do you think you (and your family) need to have in savings for
emergencies and other unexpected things that may come up?” A household that has
enough liquid non investment assets to satisfy these needs would be more likely to have a
tax-efﬁcient investment portfolio.
20. Another concern about using ﬁrm size, is that larger ﬁrms are more likely to provide
matching TDA contributions in the form of company stock. Indeed, a recent survey con-
ducted by The Proﬁt Sharing/401k Council of America indicates that while 37 percent of
corporations with more than ﬁve thousand employees match with company stock, only 3
percent of companies with less than ﬁve hundred employees do the same. This difference
is also due to the fact that smaller ﬁrms rarely have publicly traded stocks and, thus, are
much less likely to offer company stock as an investment option (13.5% as compared with
76.7%).
21. Even though eligibility is a direct measure of the extent of TDA saving opportunities
(as opposed to ﬁrm size), it is also not an ideal instrument because of its relationship with
the underlying household preferences (Weisbenner 2002; Pence 2002) for a detailed dis-
cussion of selection and education effects. Similar concerns can also be raised with respect
to the size of employer match.
22. There are several such accounts—Keogh, SEP-IRA, etc.—all of which have high con-
tribution limits. For example, Keogh plans allow one to save up to forty thousand dollars
per year in combined employee and employer contributions.
23. In order to correct for extreme skewness in distribution of ﬁnancial and housing
wealth, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine function advocated by Carroll, Dynan, and Krane
(2003). This transformation is described by  (W,  )   ln[ W   ( 2W 2   1)0.5]/ , where
  controls the degree to which large values are downweighted. Unlike log transform, 
 -transform can handle negative and zero observations as well.
24. In an unreported exercise, I test for sample selection bias produced by restricting the
regression sample to households that have positive wealth in both account types. The like-
lihood ratio test of independence of the selection and tax-efﬁciency equations in the Heck-
man sample selection probit model cannot be rejected at the 10 percent conﬁdence level.
25. Recall that in models that generate Tepper-Black tax-efﬁcient outcomes, swlthTDAhas
a positive relationship with equity shares in both account types.
26. The set of moments for GMM estimation consists of the ﬁrst order conditions of the
log-likelihood function for equation (B1), the OLS estimator of equation (B4), and the
two moments from OLS estimation of coefﬁcient vectors used to impute the probabil-
ity of unemployment and standard deviation of labor income in the SCF. The ﬁrst mo-
ment condition is based on the conditional log-likelihood functions for probit and bi-
variate tobit in cases (B2) and (B3), respectively (Greene 1999). Details are available
upon request.
38 Amromin27. The PSID panel used for estimation of  PSID consists of 1,396 households, with 9 obser-
vations per household. The CPS sample used for estimation of  CPS has 120,477 observa-
tions.
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